INTRODUCTION
This article is about the rise of non-state forms of international authority, and the transformative effects these are having on economic relationships and political processes in the emerging post-Cold War world. Until the erosion of Soviet dominance over eastern Europe in the fall of 1989, and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union itself, international political relations were conditioned by an overriding concern with the maintenance of an effective security framework in which possible threats could be contained.2 With the end of the Cold War, and the obsolescence of many of the relationships undergirding this phenomenon, the atten-(? T.J. Sinclair 1994 0969-2290 tion of much of the scholarly international relations community has shifted from these concerns. While this very visible drama has been playing itself out on the nightly television news another has been unfolding behind closed doors. Starting in the early 1960s, offshore capital markets -places where funds are raised by selling debt obligations and equity outside the constraints of government regulation -have rapidly become global in character, stimulated initially by a desire on the part of American financiers to get around the restrictive US banking laws created during the Depression.3 During the 1970s, and into the first half of the 1980s, the freedom of these non-national money markets was matched by a slackening of regulation within domestic finance industries, led by the United States. Other governments, including those of Britain, Japan and Canada were obliged to follow this path or suffer declines in their own finance sectors, as funds were relocated to more open markets.4 Accordingly, during the 1980s, 'many of the boundaries between national financial markets dissolved and a truly global capital market began to emerge'.5
What questions does the decline of Cold War tensions and the development of a global capital market raise? Among these are: What will be the new organizing principles of the emerging world order? Where will authority be derived in the post-Cold War era of global capital mobility? What new conceptual tools will scholars need to understand these phenomena? This article evaluates these questions through an analysis of debt security rating processes. Debt security rating is portrayed in this article as a significant mechanism of authority in its own right, and as an exemplar of the form of authority that is organizing the emerging world order. Accordingly, the generalizations developed here will have applicability beyond the capital markets. Leading off the article is an evaluation of trends in the division of authority between global civil society and national states.6 Rosenau's notion of 'governance without government' is then introduced as a way of understanding the new found influence of non-state institutions.7 Subsequently, the article evaluates specific developments within international finance that have influenced which institutions and processes have gained authority and which have diminished in power. These developments point to the significance of the rating agencies. Some basic background material is then provided on the agencies, followed by a discussion of debt security rating processes. What information goes into a rating and how this material is analysed are examined here. A more theoretical section follows in which the governance 'powers' of the rating institutions are elaborated. This discussion is followed by an appraisal of the implications of rating agency governance for investment, policy and national determination. Finally, the article returns to the broader theme of the future character of the emerging world order in light of the mechanism identified.
GOVERNANCE
The development of the global political economy (GPE) has irreparably changed the authority structures that developed with the rise of the Western state system subsequent to Westphalia. 'At the core of the new order', suggests Rosenau, is '... . a relocation of authority that [has] transformed the capacities of governments'.9 The 'state-centric system' of the Westphalian order is now being replaced by a 'multicentric system', bifurcated between state and non-state actors.'0 Because of the transnational character of many economic, political and climatic developments, 'national governments are decreasingly competent to address and resolve major issues confronting their societies'." This does not mean that the sovereignty of states has ended, but rather, that the 'exclusivity and scope of their competence' has altered significantly, 'narrowing the range within which their authority and legitimacy are operative'.'2 These developments may also be interpreted as expressive of a political strategy. Gill has labelled this strategy the 'new constitutionalism', which seeks to /place restraints on the democratic control of public and private economic organization and institutions', premised on neo-liberal assumptions about the efficiency of market forces. He suggests that some states, such as the US, are likely to be less accountable to international market forces than others, based on their divergent positions within the GPE, and thus that 'some states are more sovereign than others in the emerging world order'."3 Both Rosenau's and Gill's respective conceptions of the emerging world order problematize the mainstream assumptions about interstate relations and the nature of authority itself. The orthodox, neo-realist understanding of authority in international relations has been one that focuses on the legally binding actions of governments."4 Ferguson and Mansbach propose that authority be understood instead as a process in which 'law is only one possible source of legitimacy that enhances the capacity of political actors to govern effectively . . . '15 This implies that authority is socially constructed and based on some measure of voluntary compliance, as was the auctoritas of the Roman Senate. Auctoritas had the character of 'more than a counsel and less than a command; rather a counsel with which one could not properly avoid compliance'.'6 Based on such a notion of authority, 'a wide range of governmental and nongovernmental entities may, in fact, govern effectively and thus be an "authority" or "polity" within their particular domain(s)'.'7 Following in the conceptual footsteps of Foucault, Rosenau has developed a useful way of thinking about these shifts in the location of authority in the emerging world order. He argues that the crucial category to think about is governance: the 'system of rule'.18 It only exists when it is accepted by the majority, whereas governments can function (up to a point) despite opposition. Governance may exist without government where there are 'regulatory mechanisms in a sphere of activity which function effectively even though they are not endowed with formal authority'."9 Similarly, one can conceive of government without governance. However, essential to identifying a regulatory mechanism is observing 'intentionality'."0 Governance only exists in self-conscious arrangements, and must be distinguished from arrangements which derive from the 'aggregation of individual decisions'.2' For example, a market is an aggregation of individual decisions and does not express governance in this sense, whereas market rules or institutions that intervene in markets represent self-conscious arrangements and thus regulatory mechanisms of governance.' The following section discusses the context in which the regulatory mechanisms of governance examined in this article have developed.
THE CHANGING FORM OF GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS
The argument is that the nature of wholesale financing has changed significantly over the last decade or so, and that this has affected the nature of the authority exercised in the capital markets by regulatory mechanisms. According to Sassen, since the 1980s, the 'marketplace has assumed new strategic and routine economic functions'.' Financing has increasingly become disintermediated, which has created information problems for those wishing to lend money and for those wishing to borrow. This process has led to the disempowerment of traditional intermediating institutions, notably banks, and the empowerment of others, such as debt security rating agencies.
Two ways of organizing the allocation of investment funds have been in competition with each other since the rise of the GPE. The primary way in which funds have been loaned and borrowed has been through banks. Banks act as financial intermediaries in that they bring together the suppliers of funds and the users of funds. They borrow money, in the form of deposits, and lend at their own risk to borrowers. Those who deposit money in banks and those who borrow from them do not establish a contractual relationship with each other, but only with the bank.24 Banks cover the costs of intermediation and make a return on their investment by charging the users or borrowers of funds more than they pay to the suppliers or lenders of funds. This structure is threatened by the trend toward disintermediation. In this process, flows of funds between borrowers and lenders avoid the direct use of financial intermediaries, for instance, in cases in which companies withdraw their funds from banks and lend them directly to each other, or when corporations issue commercial paper that may merely be underwritten by a bank or investment bank."5 Globally, bank lending decreased from 37 per cent of total capital movements in the 1977-81 period to 14 per cent in 1982-6. Portfolio, as opposed to direct forms of investment grew during the same period from 36 per cent in 1972-6, to 65 per cent of total investment in 1982-6. Most of this was funded through securities offerings.26 Commercial banks increasingly take on the characteristics of investment or merchant banks, organizing issues, underwriting them, buying and selling debt in the secondary market, but not carrying these obligations on their own balance sheets. 27 Why has this trend toward disintermediation developed? Part of this story clearly has to do with the locus of control evident in securities issues versus either equity or bank debt.28 Banks typically want covenants that limit the application of funds by the borrower so that their interest stream is covered first. They might also place limits on the leveraging of the corporation that prevent it from raising its debt load, hindering management's plans for new plant and equipment. Moreover, '[b]ank lending is inherently more expensive than securitisation' because of the high overhead costs generated by the credit monitoring function of intermediation.29 The high interest rates and elevated loan defaults of the 1980s made these differentials very significant. In the case of equity finance, stock holders may expect some involvement in the major decisions of the corporation, as is their right as owners of the enterprise.
What are the implications of this trend? Has the authority that used to reside in banks dissipated, or has it taken a new form? Disintermediation creates an information problem for suppliers and users of funds.?" In an intermediated environment a lender can depend on the prudential behaviour of the bank, which is regulated and required to maintain a certain liquidity under the Basle standards. There is relatively low risk to the supplier of funds where intermediation is the norm. However, in a securitized funds environment in which no institution stands between the supplier of funds and the user, the supplier must make a judgement about the likelihood of repayment by the user. Given the high transaction costs of gathering this information for individual funds suppliers it is not surprising that institutions have developed to provide judgements on the creditworthiness of security issuers. 31 Because there is no merchant relationship between providers of these judgements and the users of this knowledge with regard to the funds themselves, this is not the same form of relationship that banks have had with their customers. The providers of the judgement risk only their credibility, not their balance sheet when they conduct this business. This interest is in making an accurate rating, not in determining which are reliable credits for the purpose of furthering their own balance sheet. However, in a disintermediated GPE, in which the creation and sale of knowledge seems to be displacing more traditional financial relationships from centre stage, these institutions of capital market judgement may have become regulatory mechanisms of governance. It is to these mechanisms -the debt security rating agencies -that this article now turns. What do bond raters actually do? Bond raters make judgements on the 'future ability and willingness of an issuer to make timely payments of principal and interest on a security over the life of the instrument'. I The more likely 'the borrower will repay both the principal and interest, in accordance with the time schedule in the borrowing agreement, the higher will be the rating assigned to the debt security'.39 Ratings are made on corporations, financial institutions, municipalities, and sovereign governments in terms of long-term obligations such as bonds or shortterm obligations such as commercial paper. The processes that lead to a rating will be discussed below. The product the bond raters produce is a letter symbol reflecting a relative ranking on a scale from most to least creditworthy. The agencies are adamant that a debt rating is 'not a recommendation to purchase, sell, or hold a security, inasmuch as it does not comment as to market price or suitability for a particular investor', because investors' risk/return trade-offs vary.40 What bond raters do must be distinguished from equity analysis, where a buy/sell recommendation is fundamental. It has become a convention in the industry to distinguish between investment and speculative grade credits as a result of US state laws enacted during the interwar period which limited the investment opportunities of pension funds to those above a certain benchmark.4" S&P provide four categories of investment grade, from AAA to BBB and seven of speculative grade, from BB to D (for default). Moody's rank from Aaa to Baa3, and Bal to C respectively.42 Both agencies have other scales for short-term debt obligations such as commercial paper. Bond raters maintain surveillance over the issues they rate and will warn investors when they consider that developments may lead to a revision to an existing rating in either an upward or downward direction. The following section of this article investigates the elements of the rating process.
DEBT SECURITY RATING

RATING METHODOLOGY
Most securities issuers approach the rating agencies themselves to initiate the rating determination, although the bond raters do on occasion approach the issuer when they become aware that a major issue is about to be offered for sale. Recently, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 415 has allowed issuers to file in advance in order to sell a given value of securities in the US when market conditions are agreeable. This has meant that corporations have been able to bring a new issue to market at very short notice. As a consequence, 'it has become common practice for issuers' managements to meet with S&P analysts on a regular, reasonably frequent basis, regardless of whether a new issue is imminent'.43 Three types of information flow into the rating process. The first type of information is the publicly available kind. This includes quantitative information such as audited financial statements and qualitative information such as media reports on the state of the industry, municipality or country. The second type is the information disclosed by the issuer themselves. This includes up-to-date financial information on the operating position of the entity. But it also includes qualitative information on accounting policy, management experience and skill, competitive position and corporate strategy. The third type of information is provided by competitors of disgruntled former employees of the issuer, amongst others. The bond raters claim this sort of information is uncommon and is treated sceptically, but they exhibit no qualms about asking questions of the issuer based on these anonymous tips." These information flows are always supplemented with extensive meetings between issuer and rater. The actual rating is made by vote in a rating committee, sometimes disparagingly referred to as the 'Star Chamber', on the recommendation of the analytical team. 45 The composition of the rating committees and the internal deliberations within the rating agencies on any particular issue are kept strictly confidential. The judgement that is made by the committee weighs the quantitative and qualitative factors in each case because 'there is no formula for combining these scores to arrive at a rating conclusion'. Accordingly, 'such judgements are highly subjective. Yet that is at the heart of every rating.'" The rating is generally subject to appeal by the issuer. But there is no regulatory requirement for this: rating opinions are defendable as free speech within the terms of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.47
Rating methodology varies by the nature of the credit. In the case of industrial debt, it is important to understand that ratings do not reflect merely the accounting or financial position of the enterprise. While that is considered fundamental to the likelihood of successful repayment of obligations, understanding financial risk is not sufficient. Financial considerations such as debt/equity ratios of various kinds are considered alongside business risk factors that influence the probability of a sufficient stream of funds flowing into the business to meet obligations. 48 In the case of municipalities, the bond raters make judgements about the future prospects for the tax base and the professionalism of local government, amongst other variables.49 This led to controversy when Moody's downgraded the City of Detroit in November 1992. City officials considered that they had met the stringent quantitative criteria for greater confidence, which had to do with the City budget, while Moody's based its negative view of the City on 'extraordinarily weak credit fundamentals' in Detroit itself, such as depopulation (the City is expected to shrink to 400,000 by 2012, from around one million people in 1992, which is already down 44 per cent on 1950), maximal tax rates and unemployment at twice the US average. Moreover, the vast majority of the City residents are poor. Raymon L. Flynn, the Mayor of Boston and past president of the United States Conference of Mayors, is critical of the inclusion of factors such as these by the bond raters because he believes these are the sort of issues that should be judged by the electorate and do not impact directly on creditworthiness.' In the case of sovereign credits, a judgement has to be made by the agencies not just about the capacity to repay but also the willingness to repay. This is an important consideration because 'the enforceability of a legal claim against a sovereign government by a foreign investor is limited at best'.5' Creditworthiness is a dynamic condition and the quality of the rating output immediately starts to deteriorate as new events occur which impact on the liquidity and solvency of the debtor. Accordingly, the agencies place a great deal of emphasis on monitoring the condition of issuers on a continuous basis. This allows them to react to events more readily and give appropriate signals to the market about the condition of an issuer. This is important, because one of the major criticisms of the agencies has been the backward or historical focus of much of their credit analysis.52 Attention to surveillance presumably improves the quality of analysis, based on a much deeper institutional knowledge of their credits by rating analysts, and consequently heightened awareness of likely risks. The willingness of firms to subject themselves to this monitoring has been heightened by the aforementioned SEC Rule 415, as taking advantage of 'shelf registration' in the market requires up-to-date ratings. 53 The surveillance relationship can readily be characterized in terms of an instituted system of rule, in which information is gathered as a prelude to possible discipline, should that information reveal a break in the understanding -or rating -that underpinned the relationship.4 That discipline may take the form of a rating review and rating change, or a listing on Moody's 'Watchlist' and S&P's 'Credit Watch' lists which signal positive and negative rating implications of events or trends. Importantly, S&P place emphasis on the fact that credibility is gained when the 'record demonstrates' that an issuer's actions are consistent with its plans. This credibility may carry an issuer over a rough patch, because, 'Once earned, credibility can support the continuity of a particular credit rating' despite, say, short-term liquidity problems. 55 The next section of this article evaluates the extent to which the rating agencies can be considered mechanisms of governance. Three developments have contributed to the growth of the regulatory authority of debt security rating during the era of the GPE. These are the structural power of disintermediated debt finance, the knowledge structure that has developed around economic and financial analysis in the GPE, and the coordinative position of rating agencies with regard to economic and financial behaviour. The first development has been discussed above. Disintermediation has led to the growth of the structural power of securitized finance, in which structural power is understood as the capacity to condition the context in which events occur, as opposed to the behavioural power over the course of events themselves, by shaping the conceptual frameworks that market actors use to understand situations and the subsequent range of choices they consider to be within the acceptable range.57 The same process has reduced the struc- The final factor which has contributed to the regulatory capacity of rating agencies is the fact that they are institutions in what is an increasingly deinstitutionalized context, where traditional forms of authority and organization are less and less evident. Banks are no longer the sources of authority they once were, and governments have increasingly become (sic) 'nightwatchmen' over their capital markets rather than allocators or managers of capital investment. This leaves few institutions left with oversight and knowledge of the market, other than market participants. This must increase the structural power of debt rating agencies. That rating agency judgements are increasingly the subject of media analyses probably reflects the understanding that the 'bean counters' have become important sources of coordination within an increasingly decentralized system. A 'steering mechanism' seems to have developed,' albeit imperfectly, to contain some of the contradictions generated by the liberalization of markets and provide a 'degree of orderliness' to corporate behaviour.7' According to Mintz and Schwartz, this 'orderliness' has two aspects. The first aspect relates to situations where the agencies 'directly intervene in the affairs of a corporation' and in 'certain circumstances . .. dictate corporate policy'.74 The other dimension captures the broader sense of rating agency power as mechanisms of regulatory governance, through the exercise of structural power. In this dimension, the agencies can be seen to in part create a 'set of de facto rules' which 'responsible corporate citizens' must honour or 'risk financial disfavour'.75 According to Mintz and Schwartz, this has created a situation of hegemonic control in which corporate activity is conditioned by the desire to appeal to the preferences of the rating agencies so as to gain access to cheap capital, or conversely, not to lose such competitively advantageous access.76 It seems that the 'internationalized policy pro-cess', which provides some measure of coordination within the GPE, occurs not just at the level of relations between states, but within transnational capital itself. Two considerations are important with regard to these transnational regulatory institutions. The first of these is the inadequacy of the existing interstate framework for macroeconomic coordination. Group of Seven or European Union structures have not proven themselves adequate to meet these challenges, as the global exchange crisis in the fall of 1992 has indicated. Yet the process of articulating and reinforcing the knowledge structure of economic and financial analysis through non-state institutions seems to have produced considerable change at the microeconomic policy level, as exemplified by some Latin American countries. The second consideration is that these forms of governance are, of course, private in nature, not subject to the usual forms of public accountability. Governance of the type identified here may reflect and in turn help to constitute a world order in which the demands of investment maximization are increasingly unchallenged. The following section explores the implications of rating agencies considered as regulatory mechanisms of governance.
RATING AGENCIES AS REGULATORY MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE
IMPLICATIONS OF AGENCY GOVERNANCE
What you consumed over your lifetime was in part borrowed, and even today it still is . . . but at the end of the day if people don't believe it, then someone will pull the plug . .. the only difference between an African Third World state and a Canada or New Zealand is that they actually hit the end of their credit limit very quickly; we're given much more rope to hang ourselves with ... but when your credit rating is on the line, that focuses the mind.7
Growth in the structural power of debt security rating can be assessed in three broad categories. The first set of implications is for investment, the second is for policy choice and the third is for national determination. What are the implications for investment? The investigation of rating agency governance for investment is broken down into three sets of questions. First, the question of cost of capital. Do ratings make a difference to the cost of debt? Second, there is the important issue of the perception of the role of ratings. What tells us that people in the market think that ratings are crucial? Finally, there is the question of the perception of rating agencies as powerful. Are bond raters acknowledged as quasi-public authorities? Is it a widespread view that bond raters are part of the context of the market, although there may be criticism of them at the margins?
The primary influence on the new issue and secondary corporate bond markets as a whole are shifts in interest rates.78 These determine the price that issuers as a collective must offer to attract funds into their market and away from other investment opportunities such as banks, the stock market and real estate. Beyond these general influences there are the particular circumstances of the debt instrument itself. For example, whether the bond is backed by a sinking fund, in which the issuing company sets aside revenue for the purpose of debt repayment.79 Other things being equal, the primary factor that distinguishes between different bonds is the creditworthiness of the borrower. However, as Foster observes: 'There is a dispute in the literature over whether debt-security ratings convey new information to capital market participants (that is, beyond that already in the public domain from other sources).'8" It may be the case that the market has made its own assessment of the creditworthiness of the issuer. Quantitative analysis has not progressed sufficiently to attribute causation. This controversy is even more pronounced with regard to the impact of downgrades on yield spreads in the secondary market, as one rater observed. Fearing this sort of judgement, which has hampered General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GM's finance company subsidiary) by raising the cost of commercial paper sales, GM has been forced to raise bank lines of credit instead, 'completing the largest bank credit package ever', with the attendant costs of intermediation, as discussed elsewhere in this article.95 GM has also been raising relatively high-cost equity capital in response to the impact of reduced credit ratings on the cost of debt finance. 96 The second type of leverage the agencies possess is structural power. Because it has to do with frameworks of thought, structural power is much harder to detail empirically and disentangle from other influences on the way managers think and act. However, it is also probably the more significant aspect of the relationship between rating agencies and the capital markets. A flavour of this structural power can be picked up from trade journals such as Institutional Investor and Euromoney, which act as mouthpieces for industry concerns about rating proficiency. These help to spread the understanding amongst pension fund managers -the lenders of funds -and corporate CFOs (chief finance officers) and their public sector equivalents -the borrowers of funds -that rating agencies expect more than just getting the numbers right from credits, that credits are expected to show foresight in management and business acumen, as well as financial prudence.97 A measure of the structural power of the rating agencies can be gained from Glen Yago's observation that 'In some of my discussions in Washington [relating to the junk bond phenomenon], I found Congressional leaders who mistakenly thought that rating and credit analysis of bonds was done by government agencies and federally mandated.'98 Another indication of the structural power of rating agencies is that US corporations often write ratings targets into their corporate plans for the coming financial year.9 As Emmer commented, those corporations that failed to follow this path learnt in 1991, during a time of stringent bank credit rationing, the costs of not adopting this standard. Indeed, interviews in London confirmed the fact that recessionary conditions have heightened the structural leverage of rating agencies, as alternative sources of credit, such as bank loans, dry up and as difficult operating conditions induce a desire to play a more cautious commercial game."? These factors place a greater emphasis on taking the views of rating agencies into account prior to rating determinations.
If rating agencies have behavioural and structural leverage over corporations it becomes a question of whether rating agencies are a new form of financial intermediation? Has the old type of intermediation by banks simply given way to a new intermediary in the form of a rating agency? The answer to this question seems to be no. Rating agencies do not have the same relationship to borrowers and lenders as banks do. They neither lend nor borrow like banks, and thus have entirely different legal obligations. Nor do they place their balance sheets directly on the line when they issue a rating. While their credibility is at stake (and the importance of this cannot be understated) this does not establish the same incentives on behaviour as entering into a financial transaction. There is no pecuniary advantage to the rating agency from any particular rating determination, whereas this is the case with financial transactions between banks and their customers. Thus, the nature of the contract in either case places different incentives on banks and rating agencies which lead to different roles in the market and distinguishable effects on capital allocation. Bond raters simply want to issue a rating which reflects the probability of repayment at the contracted rate of interest at the right time. 
CONCLUSIONS
The argument of this article is that debt security rating agencies are exemplars of the new location and form of authority that is shaping international relations in the emerging world order. There are three aspects to this authority. The first has to do with the division of authority between state and non-state institutions, the second concerns the distribution of power among non-state institutions, and finally, the third has to do with conflict between rising and declining sectors of finance. The rise of the GPE and the decline of exogenous threats has changed the balance of authority between institutions of government and institutions of global civil society. Global civil society has become relatively empowered while state institutions have become less significant in the way things get done. Although both elected authority and what might be called 'manifest authority' are bound together in many ways in terms of the reproduction of political order, the argument here is that the shift in authority, as exemplified by debt security rating, has changed the character of that order in significant ways.
The second aspect of authority in the emerging world order to consider is its sectoral character. Although a shift from 'high' to 'low' politics, and from state to non-state institutions within the GPE has been identified, a relocation of authority within the GPE itself is observed. This transformation has involved the erosion of the control formerly exercised by some of the great industrial concerns, and a corresponding increase in the leverage available to financial forces and those industries in which information is the raw material and knowledge the product. The downgrading of General Motors by the rating agencies reflects this shift. Accordingly, finance may, to use Robert Cox's words, have increasingly 'become decoupled from production to become an independent power, an autocrat over the real economy'." ' The final aspect of the relocation of authority to consider are the transformations within the financial realm itself. International political economy has expended a great deal of its initial research effort on studying the activities of the major international banks and their regulation. This made a lot of sense when the LDC debt crisis threatened to overwhelm the international credit system. However, that risk did not materialize and banks have subsequently become the preserve of the most marginal users of funds in the United States, and increasingly elsewhere. In global capital markets, banks have been exposed to much greater competition by their governments and have come under pressure to play the markets like any other investor. The increased cost of this activity has been passed along to funds users, raising the cost of capital to them, reducing their demand and spurring the drive to securitization. With the growth of alternative mechanisms for gathering information about credits and producing saleable knowledge about them, the rationale for banking intermediation of credit allocation is threatened. Banks will -in the medium term at least -continue to be major pools of funds because of their retail activities. But they will become less like lenders and more like portfolio managers, and consequently less like sources of authority in the market and more like just another part of the market itself.'20 The creation of knowledge and the passing of judgement, based on a strategic position in the production of financial, economic and policy information, will increasingly fall to debt security rating agencies.
What will be the effect of all this upon the emerging world order? Two probable scenarios come to mind. On one hand, the regulatory mechanisms of governance identified in this article could engender a much more thoroughgoing hegemony than has been seen before. During the Cold War, the coherence of transnational relations was maintained by exogenous threats from the Soviet Union. The regulatory mechanism identified, and perhaps others like it, have the character of endogenous forces, at least as far as the advanced industrial societies are concerned. This will probably mute opposition, or as seems to be the case in Europe, channel that opposition into rating competition. For the developing countries, it seems that they are now playing a game with a very different referee. Rating agencies, as mechanisms of governance without government do not invoke quite the same nationalist hostility that interstate regulation seems to, especially for elites in these countries, infused with a neo-liberal business ethos. The medium-term effect could be to further the strategy of new constitutionalism by removing many areas of domestic policy debate from the political arena, and to undermine radical intellectual elites as a new form of intellectual orthodoxy -economic and financial analysis -becomes the dominant framework in which policy issues are cast. On the other hand, this form of governance may be fragile. An order characterized by governance based in global civil society could conceivably be less dynamic than one with an active political executive. This could reduce the adaptive capacity of the global system, just as threats from transboundary problems like global warming become much more of a concern. It will certainly be the case that this order will be less inclusive than in the past. This may mean that the trend to urban decay typified by the City of Detroit may accelerate and spread to other areas of the world as they too come to be judged by this regulatory mechanism. 
